Russia and its “Special Operation” in Ukraine

[magnkarl]

1 hour ago, HanoiVillan said:

Just on this point, you are not going to see eastern European NATO members acting unilaterally, against the interests and preferences of the actual military powers in the alliance. To do so would be to place the entire alliance - and its literally invaluable benefit for these countries of being under the American security umbrella - at risk, and nobody is that stupid.

European countries are sometimes good - not that often to be honest - at talking belligerantly, but most of the countries you name have weekend armies, they're not going to be fighting the Russian army in eastern Ukraine.

I think you're seriously understimating anti-Russian sentiment in Poland, the Baltics, and the rest of the ex-Soviet republics. They know that if Russia is allowed to bully Ukraine they're likely next. They need to stop Putin before he acquires land and more manpower. Russia itself is a country in massive decline, the only way to stop that for Putin is to get his hands on functioning new areas and populations. He's not going to be able to bomb Ukraine into oblivion like he did with Georgia as Poland and the other ex republics will very likely intervene. It's a domino Putin can't win.

[Panto_Villan]

1 minute ago, magnkarl said:

When I say underfunded, I of course mean in comparison to what Putin wants to stop. Where do you get your reservist troop count from? That number has been debunked many times. The reservist pool for a country like Ukraine would be larger in a self dense scenario.

                                         NATO                    EU                      Russia

Pop:                               961 mil               446 mil               144 mil with a downtrend

Active troops:                3.6 mil                1.4 mil                1 mil

Reserves:                       2 mil                    2 mil                   200k

Military spending:      1.3 tril dollar      200 bil euro       48 bil dollar

 

The power disparity isn't even close. If Putin is dumb enough to invade a country next to a bunch of anti-Russian NATO and EU countries he's stupid.

Yes, but once again you’re conflating Ukraine with NATO and the EU. He’s threatening to invade Ukraine, and the Russian military forces are vastly stronger than the Ukrainian ones (although Ukraine isn’t a pushover).

There’s absolutely no way NATO is getting involved in a war in Ukraine in any military capacity. The big players have already ruled it out, so are you really suggesting the Baltic nations etc are going to attack Russia by themselves?

[magnkarl]

18 minutes ago, Panto_Villan said:

Yes, but once again you’re conflating Ukraine with NATO and the EU. He’s threatening to invade Ukraine, and the Russian military forces are vastly stronger than the Ukrainian ones (although Ukraine isn’t a pushover).

There’s absolutely no way NATO is getting involved in a war in Ukraine in any military capacity. The big players have already ruled it out, so are you really suggesting the Baltic nations etc are going to attack Russia by themselves?

No. I'm suggesting that the other ex-republics are likely to make a very strong case for arming, training and helping Ukraine to the point where Putin will have to put a large part of his army, fleet and capability next to Norway, the Baltics, Poland, Azerbaijan/Turkey. It's not even imaginable that Russia will be able to deploy its whole army in the Ukraine as Putin is scared of NATO. He might do 100.000. 100.000 isn't enough to take Ukraine. 

Putin can't bomb Ukraine, he can't use cruise missiles as Poland/Turkey/Romania will likely respond and shoot these down. He'll have to go up against a well dug in, well armed, fortified and anti-tank specialised army in a rather large country. It's not Georgia.

Remove geo-politics and Putin might've done it. Include geo-politics and you see Britain, the Baltics, Poland and parts of NATO/EU/USA already arming Ukraine to the teeth. It'll simply cost Putin too much to even try.

The US alone has given Ukraine 2.7 billion dollars in funding for arms in the last 6-7 years. That's before you look at what others have given. It's not the walkover that you and others theorise. It's much easier to bleed Putin dry in Ukraine than it is to have him on your own doorstep.

It's naive to think that the other ex-soviet countries won't react if Putin starts invading again, they've all tasted the cruelty, mistreatment and general poverty under Soviet rule. It's not something they're going to tolerate.

Edited January 25, 2022 by magnkarl

[Panto_Villan]

44 minutes ago, magnkarl said:

No. I'm suggesting that the other ex-republics are likely to make a very strong case for arming, training and helping Ukraine to the point where Putin will have to put a large part of his army, fleet and capability next to Norway, the Baltics, Poland, Azerbaijan/Turkey. It's not even imaginable that Russia will be able to deploy its whole army in the Ukraine as Putin is scared of NATO. He might do 100.000. 100.000 isn't enough to take Ukraine. 

Putin can't bomb Ukraine, he can't use cruise missiles as Poland/Turkey/Romania will likely respond and shoot these down. He'll have to go up against a well dug in, well armed, fortified and anti-tank specialised army in a rather large country. It's not Georgia.

Remove geo-politics and Putin might've done it. Include geo-politics and you see Britain, the Baltics, Poland and parts of NATO/EU/USA already arming Ukraine to the teeth. It'll simply cost Putin too much to even try.

The US alone has given Ukraine 2.7 billion dollars in funding for arms in the last 6-7 years. That's before you look at what others have given. It's not the walkover that you and others theorise. It's much easier to bleed Putin dry in Ukraine than it is to have him on your own doorstep.

It's naive to think that the other ex-soviet countries won't react if Putin starts invading again, they've all tasted the cruelty, mistreatment and general poverty under Soviet rule. It's not something they're going to tolerate.

None of the NATO members will "be next". Putin isn't going to attack NATO because as you've said yourself, he'll lose. They don't need to intervene, they'll just shore up their defences in response to any aggression in Ukraine to make it even more clear that attacking them would be a bad idea.

Beyond that, I'm not sure what you're arguing. If you don't think the ex-Soviet states will attack Russia, why can't Putin use his full military force against Ukraine? You think NATO countries are going to start shooting at Russian jets over Ukraine or Russian troops moving towards the conflict zone through their own territories? That'd be lunacy for any country that doesn't want to get drawn into the war. Ukraine is going to have to deal with the entire Russian military machine if they choose to launch a full-scale invasion, and they'd lose.

Everything else is largely irrelevent to any conflict that might arise in the next two weeks. Training is a long term thing. A few anti-tank missiles is hardly going to tip the balance, even if the sort of Russian tanks that would be used to spearhead an invasion were actually vulnerable to Javelins and the like (and they're not). Ukraine barely has an air force, has inferior armoured vehicles, and they're outnumbered. Of course they're in better shape than they were in 2014 but that doesn't mean they're capable of stopping a Russian invasion.

[magnkarl]

4 minutes ago, Panto_Villan said:

None of the NATO members will "be next". Putin isn't going to attack NATO because as you've said yourself, he'll lose. They don't need to intervene, they'll just shore up their defences in response to any aggression in Ukraine to make it even more clear that attacking them would be a bad idea.

Beyond that, I'm not sure what you're arguing. If you don't think the ex-Soviet states will attack Russia, why can't Putin use his full military force against Ukraine? You think NATO countries are going to start shooting at Russian jets over Ukraine or Russian troops moving towards the conflict zone through their own territories? That'd be lunacy for any country that doesn't want to get drawn into the war. Ukraine is going to have to deal with the entire Russian military machine if they choose to launch a full-scale invasion, and they'd lose.

Everything else is largely irrelevent to any conflict that might arise in the next two weeks. Training is a long term thing. A few anti-tank missiles is hardly going to tip the balance, even if the sort of Russian tanks that would be used to spearhead an invasion were actually vulnerable to Javelins and the like (and they're not). Ukraine barely has an air force, has inferior armoured vehicles, and they're outnumbered. Of course they're in better shape than they were in 2014 but that doesn't mean they're capable of stopping a Russian invasion.

Do you honestly think Putin will use all his armed forces for an invasion of Ukraine? What happens when Russian jets fly over Polish\Romanian\Turkish\Baltic air territory? You paint a picture where Ukraine is floating alone in an ocean. Europe went to war with ISIL over a few million refugees from the middle east. What do you think will happen when that number is 20 million from Ukraine? Poland\the Baltics\Romania\Bulgaria and so on will use any chance they have at supplying Ukraine with false flag troops, support, and anything else to keep Russia fighting and bankrupting themselves in a country which will be extremely hostile to Putin.

I'm not saying ex-Soviet states will attack Russia, I'm saying that they'll all chip in with anything bar open combat to sabotage Putin's war effort. How long can Putin effectively fight a full scale war in Ukraine with financial sanctions from the leading powers of the world? How long can Belarus be Putin's launch pad before Poland starts pushing back? There's many pieces besides the two very isolated ones in Russia and Ukraine. Geo-politics, refugees, Putin's finances, civilian casualties, air-space intrusions, build up and NATO-exercises in Norway and the Baltics. I can assure you Putin won't commit even half of his army to Ukraine because he knows that the peace he has in the Baltics and with Azerbaijan is extremely fragile. If he were to commit too much to Ukraine, provoke any of his long standing opponents with say a drone strike on unarmed civilians and then get caught overloaded in the Ukraine he'd be effed. He's not got the machinery or the finances that Stalin had, he's ruling a country that could erupt in full scale rioting if they were pushed much further.

[tonyh29]

quite an interesting read  , time will tell i guess 

The evidence so far points to Russia looking toward talks, not invasion. The initial reaction was set off by Russia’s movement of military assets within the Southern and Western military districts. The movements did not even represent a serious addition of forces to these command areas but a repositioning of different assets.

But there is a plausible argument that these are not a serious threat to Ukraine. In an article published in the Dutch-language magazine Knack and also on social media, Sim Tack, an independent military analyst (and previous co-author of mine) has noted that there has been more of a concentration of equipment than of personnel. He suggested last month that “Russia appears to experiment with forward positioning of equipment over longer durations of time than we usually see. They have done this first at Opuk between April and October, and now at Yelnya, Novoozerne, and Bakhchysarai. An emulation of NATO procedures in Eastern Europe.”

As Tack notes, the Russian air force has been largely absent from these movements. Air superiority would be a critical component of any ground offensive, so the lack of movement other than some helicopter formations is a major point against an imminent offensive.

(more on link)

[HanoiVillan]

1 hour ago, magnkarl said:

I think you're seriously understimating anti-Russian sentiment in Poland, the Baltics, and the rest of the ex-Soviet republics. They know that if Russia is allowed to bully Ukraine they're likely next. They need to stop Putin before he acquires land and more manpower. Russia itself is a country in massive decline, the only way to stop that for Putin is to get his hands on functioning new areas and populations. He's not going to be able to bomb Ukraine into oblivion like he did with Georgia as Poland and the other ex republics will very likely intervene. It's a domino Putin can't win.

No, this is fevered nonsense, sorry. The situation is undeniably extremely tense, but you are imagining a level of risk that does not exist. 'They're likely next' is just not a true statement, and if it were to be true, that would mean that one or both sides had made a huge, history-making miscalculation. Russia has not at any point threatened any NATO countries, the dispute is about Ukraine, and primarily two provinces within eastern Ukraine.

12 minutes ago, magnkarl said:

Do you honestly think Putin will use all his armed forces for an invasion of Ukraine? What happens when Russian jets fly over Polish\Romanian\Turkish\Baltic air territory? You paint a picture where Ukraine is floating alone in an ocean. Europe went to war with ISIL over a few million refugees from the middle east. What do you think will happen when that number is 20 million from Ukraine? Poland\the Baltics\Romania\Bulgaria and so on will use any chance they have at supplying Ukraine with false flag troops, support, and anything else to keep Russia fighting and bankrupting themselves in a country which will be extremely hostile to Putin.

I'm not saying ex-Soviet states will attack Russia, I'm saying that they'll all chip in with anything bar open combat to sabotage Putin's war effort. How long can Putin effectively fight a full scale war in Ukraine with financial sanctions from the leading powers of the world?

This is more fevered fantasy. The simple reality is that right now, it is the middle of winter, and every one of the countries you have named is highly dependent on Russian natural gas imports, as are much more important countries within the NATO alliance like the UK and Germany. If Russia attacks Ukraine, will there be an effort to find additional sanctions that can be put in place? Definitely yes, there will have to be, for appearance's sake. But NATO's ability to hobble Russia's economy is in fact limited by the reliance on its gas exports, and the fact that Russia has run up huge foreign exchange reserves since 2014. Sanctions are already in place over the annexation of Crimea so in reality the space for new sanctions to make a meaningful difference to anything is somewhat limited.

The idea that NATO member states will be pursuing an irregular war with 'false flag troops' is pretty unrealistic; while there is always some skullduggery going on, no serious military action is going to be sanctioned by the most powerful states within NATO and any country making a serious and meaningful effort at privateering on this topic risks being thrown out of the alliance for risking a third world war.

You are in general greatly over-rating the west's actual commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty, especially of those two provinces of which it has only been in partial de facto control for nearly a decade now.

[Panto_Villan]

10 minutes ago, magnkarl said:

Do you honestly think Putin will use all his armed forces for an invasion of Ukraine? What happens when Russian jets fly over Polish\Romanian\Turkish\Baltic air territory? You paint a picture where Ukraine is floating alone in an ocean. Europe went to war with ISIL over a few million refugees from the middle east. What do you think will happen when that number is 20 million from Ukraine? Poland\the Baltics\Romania\Bulgaria and so on will use any chance they have at supplying Ukraine with false flag troops, support, and anything else to keep Russia fighting and bankrupting themselves in a country which will be extremely hostile to Putin.

I'm not saying ex-Soviet states will attack Russia, I'm saying that they'll all chip in with anything bar open combat to sabotage Putin's war effort. How long can Putin effectively fight a full scale war in Ukraine with financial sanctions from the leading powers of the world? How long can Belarus be Putin's launch pad before Poland starts pushing back? There's many pieces besides the two very isolated ones in Russia and Ukraine. Geo-politics, refugees, Putin's finances, civilian casualties, air-space intrusions, build up and NATO-exercises in Norway and the Baltics. I can assure you Putin won't commit even half of his army to Ukraine because he knows that the peace he has in the Baltics and with Azerbaijan is extremely fragile. If he were to commit too much to Ukraine, provoke any of his long standing opponents with say a drone strike on unarmed civilians and then get caught overloaded in the Ukraine he'd be effed. He's not got the machinery or the finances that Stalin had, he's ruling a country that could erupt in full scale rioting if they were pushed much further.

I think NATO was being honest when they said they wouldn’t intervene militarily in Ukraine. Even if there’s mass unarmed civilian casualties, the alternative is a war with Russia and there’s no appetite for that over Ukraine. A war with Russia is a whole different ball game to the war with ISIL for many reasons.

There’s plenty more to pick apart in your reply (why would Russian jets need to fly over NATO territory when Ukraine is right next to Russia?) but that seems to be the crux of it. You think NATO is going to intervene in Ukraine and I don’t.

I think the evidence pretty strongly supports my position rather than yours, but I’ve said my piece and if you’re not convinced then you’re not convinced. I think any further debate would just be retreading the same ground.

[magnkarl]

2 minutes ago, HanoiVillan said:

No, this is fevered nonsense, sorry. The situation is undeniably extremely tense, but you are imagining a level of risk that does not exist. 'They're likely next' is just not a true statement, and if it were to be true, that would mean that one or both sides had made a huge, history-making miscalculation. Russia has not at any point threatened any NATO countries, the dispute is about Ukraine, and primarily two provinces within eastern Ukraine.

This is more fevered fantasy. The simple reality is that right now, it is the middle of winter, and every one of the countries you have named is highly dependent on Russian natural gas imports, as are much more important countries within the NATO alliance like the UK and Germany. If Russia attacks Ukraine, will there be an effort to find additional sanctions that can be put in place? Definitely yes, there will have to be, for appearance's sake. But NATO's ability to hobble Russia's economy is in fact limited by the reliance on its gas exports, and the fact that Russia has run up huge foreign exchange reserves since 2014. Sanctions are already in place over the annexation of Crimea so in reality the space for new sanctions to make a meaningful difference to anything is somewhat limited.

The idea that NATO member states will be pursuing an irregular war with 'false flag troops' is pretty unrealistic; while there is always some skullduggery going on, no serious military action is going to be sanctioned by the most powerful states within NATO and any country making a serious and meaningful effort at privateering on this topic risks being thrown out of the alliance for risking a third world war.

You are in general greatly over-rating the west's actual commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty, especially of those two provinces of which it has only been in partial de facto control for nearly a decade now.

I'm not saying that the West is committed to Ukraine's sovereignty.  I'm saying that they are committed to an ever increasing weakening of Putin's rule. That's why Ukraine has been given aid in the billions since they were last invaded. The aim is to a) deter Russia, b) bleed Russia dry if they were to invade. The gas supplied by Putin is already at prices which makes it uneconomical for much of Europe's industry to use, Norway and the US can plug that gap if they were to not follow Russia's pricing. 

I'm surprised of the fear that so many people have over Russia, in reality their 'first rate' military capability isn't all that. They've got a good amount of paratroopers, excellent SAM systems (S-400), very few excellent fighters (SU 35 and 57) and good special forces. It's not the Soviet union of 1951. Just like the US they've proven that they're not good at grinding wars (Afghanistan, Chechnya) and will likely lose much more in this war than what their population will tolerate.

Yes, the SU57 is a good plane, but it's a bit like the Tiger 2 in WW2, there's so few of them that they're not really that dangerous. The T72 is still the backbone of Russian armored columns, it's not really on par with much of modern machinery anymore. There's not enough T-14's that they can be as effective as people are touting.

[Panto_Villan]

10 minutes ago, HanoiVillan said:

No, this is fevered nonsense, sorry. The situation is undeniably extremely tense, but you are imagining a level of risk that does not exist. 'They're likely next' is just not a true statement, and if it were to be true, that would mean that one or both sides had made a huge, history-making miscalculation. Russia has not at any point threatened any NATO countries, the dispute is about Ukraine, and primarily two provinces within eastern Ukraine.

I actually disagree with this. Ultimately the dispute is about Ukraine heading in the direction of being a democracy and EU member. The two provinces were intended to be a trojan horse to destabilise Ukraine - which is why Putin was pushing for a federal Ukraine in the Minsk ceasefire deal, where the provinces would have a say in how Ukraine has been run - but that has failed because Ukraine has basically just walled them off so Putin currently has little leverage over politics in the rest of Ukraine.

That's why I think there's scope for the invasion being about more than just annexing those territories. If Putin thinks the costs are acceptable (FWIW I don't think he will) then he'll be trying his best to bring Ukraine back into Russian orbit by bringing down the government or installing a puppet regime, or just damaging the country's infrastructure severely in order to make a point about the costs of trying to break away from Russia.

[Loxstock92]

I wonder if the club had this in mind when expanding our global reach.

[Davkaus]

I think there might be a reason we're "not hearing this anywhere else"

[Panto_Villan]

44 minutes ago, magnkarl said:

I'm not saying that the West is committed to Ukraine's sovereignty.  I'm saying that they are committed to an ever increasing weakening of Putin's rule. That's why Ukraine has been given aid in the billions since they were last invaded. The aim is to a) deter Russia, b) bleed Russia dry if they were to invade. The gas supplied by Putin is already at prices which makes it uneconomical for much of Europe's industry to use, Norway and the US can plug that gap if they were to not follow Russia's pricing. 

I'm surprised of the fear that so many people have over Russia, in reality their 'first rate' military capability isn't all that. They've got a good amount of paratroopers, excellent SAM systems (S-400), very few excellent fighters (SU 35 and 57) and good special forces. It's not the Soviet union of 1951. Just like the US they've proven that they're not good at grinding wars (Afghanistan, Chechnya) and will likely lose much more in this war than what their population will tolerate.

Yes, the SU57 is a good plane, but it's a bit like the Tiger 2 in WW2, there's so few of them that they're not really that dangerous. The T72 is still the backbone of Russian armored columns, it's not really on par with much of modern machinery anymore. There's not enough T-14's that they can be as effective as people are touting.

US and Norweigan gas can't replace Russian gas. That's why gas prices are so stupidly high in the UK at the moment, and they'd be a lot higher (or there'd be rationing) if Russia turned off the taps. Not that that's hugely relevant to the discussion imo; I think Russia would get hit with heavy sanctions if they attacked Ukraine despite it.

You seem awfully blase about going to war. People fear Russia because they have a strong military. It's not world-beating, but it is strong. The UK is the strongest military power in Europe alongside France but only has 160,000 troops total. Even if their hardware is as inferior to ours as you seem to think it is, fighting Russia would involve large numbers of casualties on both sides. The average Brit or American or Frenchman doesn't want to spend billions and see thousands of soldiers come home in bodybags just to keep Ukraine free.

A war between two countries with strong military forces is something you should fear and avoid where possible, even if you know you'd win. And that's leaving aside the non-zero chance that it ends in a nuclear confrontation, which could easily spiral into all-out nuclear war.

The Russian military isn't a joke, by the way. Here's an article you might want to read that outlines the power difference between the Russians and the Ukrainians. It actually specifically addresses the "next Afghanistan" assumption you're making.

Quote

 

Much of the Western discussion about helping Ukraine in the face of overwhelming Russian military advantage centers on relatively short-range weapons and tactics meant to enmesh an invasion force in the “next Afghanistan” or a “near certainty of hell”: for example, providing more Javelin anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and weaponized drones; or training Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian non-state groups to make improvised explosive devices. While such courses of action would impose costs, they would impose them on Russian and Russian proxy forces’ ground troops. These approaches do not consider the decisive role that Russian air and standoff missile strikes may play. If the Kremlin orders a large-scale move on Ukraine, it is likely to take the form of a multi-domain operation, beginning with air and standoff missile strikes that could prove decisive—and devastating—long before short-range defenses come into play. 

A better approach starts with looking at the Russian military’s current strategy and doctrine, the forces it has amassed nearby, and the capabilities it has shown in recent conflicts. Many Russian concepts of operation emphasize a short and intense “Initial Period of War” that may produce decisive effects even before ground forces are fully committed. Standoff weapons—bombs, precision guided missiles—are unleashed against enemy forces and the infrastructure that sustains the fight: military bases, forward-deployed units, air defense sites, airfields, key transportation nodes, fuel depots, command-and-control targets, power plants, even local news organizations. The aim is to force the enemy government to capitulate quickly.

A large-scale Russian operation against Ukraine would likely be different from previous post-Soviet operations for several reasons. The Russian military has spent the past decade refining doctrine, reorganizing its forces, and updating its arsenal. It no longer relies on large numbers of poorly trained conscripts and ill-equipped ground forces as it did in Chechnya. Its modernization program was designed to avoid the kind of disorganized, stove-piped, ground-force dominant operation seen in Georgia in 2008. Even its “hybrid” incursions into the Donbass and Crimea in 2014 may be only partially illustrative at best. 

 

 

The most illuminating illustration of current Russian tactics is probably its overt operations in Syria. But that expeditionary force was much smaller, designed only to support what Moscow claims is a counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operation. At their peak, Russian forces in Syria were only a small fraction of the strike power that is permanently based and temporary deployed near Ukraine today. 

The modernized and massive Russian military force that currently surrounds Ukraine on three sides can muster air and missile strikes that would likely overwhelm Ukrainian airpower and air defenses and severely damage military and other facilities. In particular, Russia’s Aerospace Forces, or VKS, are very different from a decade ago. They have new and modernized aircraft, along with better radar, communications, and targeting equipment. Pilots have generally flown more flight hours and received training in close air support and nighttime operations. And although they have little experience flying through hostile air defenses, 92 percent of VKS pilots have recent combat experience in Syria. The VKS also has adopted more effective countermeasures against man-portable or short-range air defenses such as Stinger missiles, including flying at higher altitudes.

Russia also fields standoff precision strike missiles that could strike any Ukrainian location from well inside Russian territory or the Black Sea. Weapons like the SS-26 short-range ballistic missile system, with a range of 250 to 350 kilometers, are already likely staging near Ukraine. Russia can strike from even farther away using the SSC-7 ground-launched cruise missile (400 to 500km), the naval SS-N-30A Kalibr land-attack cruise missile (1,500-plus km), or the strategic bomber-launched Kh-555 or Kh-101 cruise missile (2,000 to 4,000km). 

Against this strike force, Ukraine can muster only Air Force and air defense systems that are limited in number, date to the Soviet era, and are based at a small number of facilities. Russian air or missile strikes could quickly render them combat-ineffective, even if they were not outright destroyed. 

The VKS’ own integrated air defense systems would accompany Russian troops on the ground to protect them with short, intermediate, and long-range air defense systems. Russia could also move its advanced SA-21 system to certain border areas to complicate eastern Ukrainian airspace, to stop or degrade Western weapons transfers. For example, SA-21 systems equipped with the new 40N6 interceptor missile can hit targets out to 400km—and the distance between Kyiv and the Russian border near the Kursk area is around 300km. Such a deployment would threaten military and civilian aircraft operating out of large areas of eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea from Crimea. 

What would help 

It is highly unlikely that Kyiv’s supporters can provide enough materiel support to bridge the gap between Ukrainian and Russian military capabilities in a way that will deter Russian aggression in the near or intermediate term. Russia’s correlation of forces is simply too strong and Russian military assets can simply overfly or outrange many of tactical or short-range weapons like Stingers or Javelin systems by using modernized air power, standoff precision strikes, or outrange them the ground with long-range artillery. Nevertheless, there are near-term options left to support Kyiv and reduce the impact of these strikes to save lives and forces. 

In the weeks ahead, Kyiv’s partners could help the Ukrainian military and government “ride out” air and missile strikes as best they can by consulting on dispersal plans for Ukrainian air defenses (as U.S. teams recently did) or hardening plans for other critical facilities, since these locations will almost certainly be primary and early targets for Russian strikes. Ukraine’s partners might share knowledge about Russian targeting strategy to assist Ukraine in building fortifications or establishing redundancy plans for critical command and control centers or military units, or detecting Russian cyber attacks or intrusions. Finally, Ukraine’s supporters could share real-time intelligence on Russian flight operations or missile launches. . Such information could be vital when minutes count for dispersal and survival.

Finally, efforts should also stepped up to provide short- and intermediate-range air defense systems. Indeed, Ukraine has asked for help in air defense and has already started fortifying critical facilities from air attacks, which suggests a correct understanding of Russian targeting and strategy. And the United States and other allies and partners have already begun discussed providing Patriot and Israeli Iron Dome systems, both of which would be of far more use than easily overflown man-portable missiles. These would be purely defensive air-defense systems and Moscow would be hard-pressed to argue they are destabilizing to the region. But this kind of assistance should not be counted upon in the very near term. Such systems would likely take months at best to approve, deploy, create infrastructure, and train local forces to use.  

A Russian large-scale multidomain operation would be devastating for the Ukrainian military and people, and Ukraine should work to prevent that. But steps can also be taken to reduce the effects of the air and missile strikes that would likely lead off such an operation. Kyiv and its supporters must urgently take such steps.

 

 

[blandy]

1 hour ago, HanoiVillan said:

every one of the countries you have named is highly dependent on Russian natural gas imports, as are much more important countries within the NATO alliance like the UK and Germany

The UK isn't. Almost none of our gas comes from Russia.

North Sea and Norway, mostly. But the price is affected by the continental market price, so we'd suffer (more) price rises, for sure.

[HanoiVillan]

22 minutes ago, blandy said:

The UK isn't. Almost none of our gas comes from Russia.

North Sea and Norway, mostly. But the price is affected by the continental market price, so we'd suffer (more) price rises, for sure.

Good point, I had misremembered the number. I see it's less than 5%. So we can replace 'the UK' with 'France' in my comment.

[bickster]

1 hour ago, Loxstock92 said:

I wonder if the club had this in mind when expanding our global reach.

Galloway is up there with Seumas Milne. Two of the biggest Putin shills operating in the UK today

[sne]

It's happening! Again. They have form for it since they went into Ukraine 2014 around the Sotji winter Olympics.

Edited January 25, 2022 by sne

[HanoiVillan]

1 hour ago, Panto_Villan said:

I actually disagree with this. Ultimately the dispute is about Ukraine heading in the direction of being a democracy and EU member. The two provinces were intended to be a trojan horse to destabilise Ukraine - which is why Putin was pushing for a federal Ukraine in the Minsk ceasefire deal, where the provinces would have a say in how Ukraine has been run - but that has failed because Ukraine has basically just walled them off so Putin currently has little leverage over politics in the rest of Ukraine.

That's why I think there's scope for the invasion being about more than just annexing those territories. If Putin thinks the costs are acceptable (FWIW I don't think he will) then he'll be trying his best to bring Ukraine back into Russian orbit by bringing down the government or installing a puppet regime, or just damaging the country's infrastructure severely in order to make a point about the costs of trying to break away from Russia.

Yes, I'm perhaps using too much shorthand. What I mean is there are multiple levels to the conflict. On the broader level, as you say, there is a conflict between what Russia wants (for Ukraine not to join NATO or the EU, and ultimately for it instead to join their 'Eurasian group' or whatever it's called (can't remember)), and what Ukraine wants, though an important thing to remember is that public opinion is very divided about this in Ukraine; many people do not want to join either the EU or NATO (certainly joining the latter used to do very badly in polls) while others want to join one or the other or both. Public opinion is also very geographically divided east-to-west. This division is what causes the issue with the Donbas provinces, which is what I'm trying to get at in the quoted post.

I think you're being a bit too dismissive in calling them 'a trojan horse': obviously these breakaway governments are heavily supported and supplied by Russia, but it is also true that local political opinion is strongly in favour of devolution of power to the region, of Russian language rights, and of a non-combative relationship to Russia. The Minsk deal - which as you say Ukraine has refused to implement - was agreed by both Russia and Ukraine, so it should and almost certainly will form the basis of any longer-lasting agreement. That could be a federal Ukraine (a la the USA or Australia where individual regions/states/provinces have their own governments as well as the national) or a non-federal Ukraine with exceptions just for these regions (a la Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain, or Scotland, Wales and NI in the UK). One of the many issues with getting to that point is sequencing, as Russia wants a political agreement before they stop supporting the separatists (as they fear Ukraine simply will not do the promised devolution) and Ukraine wants control of the border before they do the devolution. To be honest both countries are justified in suspecting the other of being capable of backsliding on the agreement, so this is a big challenge. But again, the reason I focus on these two provinces is that I suspect that if a] the political status of these two provinces is regularised, and b] it is clear that Ukraine will not be joining NATO any time soon, that Russia may back off.

Might this analysis be too optimistic, and might Russia choose to bring down the government and install a puppet regime, or might they even invade western Ukraine beyond the Dnieper river? Unfortunately it has to be considered *possible*, even if I don't think it is *likely*. All the more reason for extreme diplomatic caution, as that would be the worst possible outcome for everyone.

[magnkarl]

1 hour ago, Panto_Villan said:

US and Norweigan gas can't replace Russian gas. That's why gas prices are so stupidly high in the UK at the moment, and they'd be a lot higher (or there'd be rationing) if Russia turned off the taps. Not that that's hugely relevant to the discussion imo; I think Russia would get hit with heavy sanctions if they attacked Ukraine despite it.

You seem awfully blase about going to war. People fear Russia because they have a strong military. It's not world-beating, but it is strong. The UK is the strongest military power in Europe alongside France but only has 160,000 troops total. Even if their hardware is as inferior to ours as you seem to think it is, fighting Russia would involve large numbers of casualties on both sides. The average Brit or American or Frenchman doesn't want to spend billions and see thousands of soldiers come home in bodybags just to keep Ukraine free.

A war between two countries with strong military forces is something you should fear and avoid where possible, even if you know you'd win. And that's leaving aside the non-zero chance that it ends in a nuclear confrontation, which could easily spiral into all-out nuclear war.

The Russian military isn't a joke, by the way. Here's an article you might want to read that outlines the power difference between the Russians and the Ukrainians. It actually specifically addresses the "next Afghanistan" assumption you're making.

 

Again, for Russia to go into a country with 140-180k active soldiers, new hardware, rich friends and home soil advantage would be as costly to Putin as a war with any other big nation would. Ukraine's military isn't small anymore. It's a cost Putin would not want to carry I think.

I'm not blase about going to war. I'm blase about Russian bluffs and war mongering. Putin played his hand and hoped everyone would back down. Now he's left with an armed, anti-Russian neighbour. I've lived through the cold war where Russia would pull this stunt every other week.

You seem very blase about wanting to fight dictators, calling their bluffs and not being scared by someone who thrives off fear.

Norwegian gas can quite easily replace Russian gas. Norway deliberately keeps production at a level which makes them earn the most. The same goes for Qatar. I'd love for you to show some kind of sources for why neither can upscale their production. Norway's promised to deliver 2 billion cubic meters more only this year.  They are only exporting to the UK from two of their 119 fields. With the right incentive they could easily increase production many-fold.

Edited January 25, 2022 by magnkarl

[Panto_Villan]

11 minutes ago, magnkarl said:

Again, for Russia to go into a country with 140-180k active soldiers, new hardware, rich friends and home soil advantage would be as costly to Putin as a war with any other big nation would. Ukraine's military isn't small anymore. It's a cost Putin would not want to carry I think.

I'm not blase about going to war. I'm blase about Russian bluffs and war mongering. Putin played his hand and hoped everyone would back down. Now he's left with an armed, anti-Russian neighbour. I've lived through the cold war where Russia would pull this stunt every other week.

You seem very blase about wanting to fight dictators, calling their bluffs and not being scared about someone who thrives off fear.

Norwegian gas can quite easily replace Russian gas. Norway deliberately keeps production at a level which makes them earn the most. The same goes for Qatar. I'd love for you to show some kind of sources for why neither can upscale their production. Norway's promised to deliver 2 billion cubic meters more only this year.  They are only exporting to the UK from two of their 119 fields. With the right incentive they could easily increase production many-fold.

How about the Norwegian PM literally saying their increased production can’t replace Russian gas? https://mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSL8N2TZ2QF
 

Did you even read the article I linked, btw? Do you disagree with it in some way?

You seem to be the only person I’ve encountered who is convinced that Ukraine can win a war against Russia. You’ve provided no evidence for it, you’ve just repeated that claim over and over but I’ve not seen a single credible source saying it’s possible.

Edited January 25, 2022 by Panto_Villan