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Tunisia, Egypt, Libya... Arab Countries in Revolt


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Erdogan has always been someone who plays the political expediency game - he'll bend whichever way is best for him on the day. Turkey's an odd country, it reflects that odd geography with one foot in Europe and one in the middle east, but, so long as he continues to let the US use Turkey as an airbase he's safe as houses.

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Erdoğan plays to the majority who are, in fact, thick as pig shit. The thin sliver of land to the west of Turkey which includes İstanbul, Bursa and Izmir is the main opposition. The majority is the rest of the country made up of people who cant read, write and will vote for him as long as he gives you a washing machine and electricity. He doesn't win their vote by talking politics he wins it by talking about how in Istanbul they drink alcohol in mosques and in Izmir their daughters stay out past 11pm. All complete bullshit but it's won him votes since 2003. That, and the fact he burnt ballot boxes and ignored votes from places he knew he wouldn't win.

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Turkey are fighting on two fronts now. Firstly, orchestrating attacks with ISIS to bomb HDP rallies in Diyarbakır a few months ago. Also it's been revealed this week that Erdoğan planned to activate ISIS sympathisers within Turkey to bomb shopping centres and metro stations in order to create public panic and a snap early election. Erdoğan is pissed the AKP didn't gain a controlling majority and his old party seems to be turning against him.

The massacre at Suruç last week highlighted Erdoğans regard for the 32 young people who died. He called them Kurdish sympathisers and said they should have kept out of it. Yet 2 soldiers die at a border crossing and they are immediately "martyred". These people were carrying toys and building equipment to help rebuild Kobanê.

Turkey is a corrupt and very nasty nationalistic state. Institutional racism is rife whereby Kurds, Armenians and Alevis are held back. Corruption is rife right up to the higher echelons (even Erdoğans). Erdogans son is siphoning off Syrian oil and gas and laundering the money through his shipping companies. Erdogans daughter is the head of an organisation who was said to be treating ISIS militants, in Turkey, in hospitals in the south east.

The AKP gov't will fire a few rockets and mortars for sure and kill scores of IS militants, but they are not afraid of killing their own people in the name of ISIS to gain votes and regain absolute parliamentary majority.

ISIS are pure scum but Erdogan's Turkey is deceitful and murderous.

Any links to backup your claims?

"Its been revealed this week"..etc

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Turkey are fighting on two fronts now. Firstly, orchestrating attacks with ISIS to bomb HDP rallies in Diyarbakır a few months ago. Also it's been revealed this week that Erdoğan planned to activate ISIS sympathisers within Turkey to bomb shopping centres and metro stations in order to create public panic and a snap early election. Erdoğan is pissed the AKP didn't gain a controlling majority and his old party seems to be turning against him.

The massacre at Suruç last week highlighted Erdoğans regard for the 32 young people who died. He called them Kurdish sympathisers and said they should have kept out of it. Yet 2 soldiers die at a border crossing and they are immediately "martyred". These people were carrying toys and building equipment to help rebuild Kobanê.

Turkey is a corrupt and very nasty nationalistic state. Institutional racism is rife whereby Kurds, Armenians and Alevis are held back. Corruption is rife right up to the higher echelons (even Erdoğans). Erdogans son is siphoning off Syrian oil and gas and laundering the money through his shipping companies. Erdogans daughter is the head of an organisation who was said to be treating ISIS militants, in Turkey, in hospitals in the south east.

The AKP gov't will fire a few rockets and mortars for sure and kill scores of IS militants, but they are not afraid of killing their own people in the name of ISIS to gain votes and regain absolute parliamentary majority.

ISIS are pure scum but Erdogan's Turkey is deceitful and murderous.

Any links to backup your claims?

"Its been revealed this week"..etc

http://mobile.todayszaman.com/national_fuat-avni-claims-erdogan-behind-suruc-attack-to-sow-chaos-in-society_394545.html ' class='bbc_url' title='External link' rel='external'> http://mobile.wnd.com/2015/07/turkish-leaders-daughter-heads-secret-isis-hospital/ ' class='bbc_url' title='External link' rel='external'> http://mobile.wnd.com/2015/07/turkish-leaders-daughter-heads-secret-isis-hospital/

It's also interesting to follow Fuat Avni. A political whistle blower who is assumed to be part of Erdoğans inner circle.

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23881ec06e2226ffa796defe40040c30.jpg

I suspect he will put rather more effort into hitting the Kurds than IS, rolling the tanks in to create Turkush controlled 'safe zones' - that coincidentally correspond with areas currently held by the YPG... Given that the YPG successes to date (against IS) have depended largely on US air strikes this could get quite complicated.

I don't know what the PKK were playing at when they murdered the two Turkish policemen but they've made a rod for their own back now.

Edited by Awol
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So Jihadi John is on the run, I hope the SAS are the ones that find him.

Sounds like there is more to this story? What you got?

 

 

Well there is this guy called Jihadi John, he has seemingly gone on the run from ISIS and I hope the SAS find him :)

 

Its fairly safe to assume we've special forces on the ground over there and I'd imagine he is a target given his profile and crimes.

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  • 1 month later...

Interesting (and long!) read on Isis in the New Statesman

 


 

...

 

In Abu Dhabi a few weeks ago, I sat late at night with my old friend Dr Rafi ­al-Issawi, the Sunni former finance minister of Iraq. He was one of the very few senior figures – Sunni or Shia – in Iraq during my time there who was prepared to reach out across sectarian boundaries and think creatively about political solutions to essentially political problems. He still does. Perhaps that is how a medical director who kept his hospital open during the savage battles for Fallujah in 2004, one of the most effective of all the Sunni politicians in Iraq and a man of integrity, is bound to think. His reward? Attempted assassination and then exile on trumped-up charges of supporting terrorism.

 

We talked of ways to bring the Sunnis back into a political process – as they had been brought back, often by themselves, between 2005 and 2008. I had the same conversation a few days later in Amman, and have done so again in the past week in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, with other Iraqi friends and politicians. Others have identical aspirations. But the Sunni leadership in Iraq, never cohesive, is now even more fragmented than it was in 2011. And the divisions along the lines of identity in Iraq, a country that the distinguished late Iraqi sociologist Ali al-Wardi once characterised as defined by multiple parallel identities, are deeper than ever before.

 

This represents the triumph of those who have sought to instrumentalise sectarian identities in the pursuit of power: to demonise Sunnis as closet Ba’athists who want revenge, to terrify the Shias with the prospect of renewed oppression, and to claim that security in a state such as Iraq (and by implication the wider region) is assured only through the communal protection afforded by the political expression of essentialist identities. And Da’esh is the flipside. Its appeal in Iraq and elsewhere is powerful. It claims to see through the broken promises and conspiracies of the past decade – ­indeed, the past century, and sometimes the past millennium. It offers a new, sacred, transnational and at the same time territorial model of righteousness. More importantly, it offers a framework within which to construe the pain of dispossession, the loss of power, the rise of others less devout, less deserving, less human. Not only does it claim to answer the question of why sinners’ ways prosper, but by framing the entire issue as one of godliness, it provides a divine dispensation for anything and everything that advances the practical goal of recapturing power and wreaking revenge on an infidel and hostile world. It combines an appeal to faith, tribalism (more precisely to asabiyya, the group solidarity that the great Arab historian Ibn Khaldun identified 600 years ago as the driver of cohesion but also of cyclical conflict in the societies he knew), resentment and the promise of glory.

 

The mobilisation of identity in the service of combatant politics is hardly exclusive to Da’esh. We see it elsewhere: nationalist identity in China, nationalist-Buddhist in the case of Burma, ethno-religious in Malaysia, sectarian and religious in the case of Islamist movements and some states across the Muslim world. We saw it in the Balkans in the 1990s. We also see a wide use of modern communications techniques to create and then exploit allegedly ancient passions and fears; the mobilisation of grievances; the deliberate destruction of individual and social solidarity; and the construction of radically simplified, harshly communal but powerful forms of connectivity.

 

The use of purposeful and often sacralised narratives to shape the approach to secular political goals may not be new. They were as much a feature of early-17th-century Europe as of Baghdad in 2010 or Cairo in 2013: think Anabaptist Münster or the English Fifth Monarchists.

 

But, it seems to me, what is new in the case of Da’esh is the striking combination of a number of features: the clarity of its transnationalism; the speed, professionalism and discipline with which its global religio-identity narratives are produced and flexed; the way these are backed by an encompassing Islamist jurisprudence (look, say, at Turki Binali’s Muqarrar fi al-Tawhid – Da’esh’s basic coursebook); the skill with which they are harnessed to its political goals. There is also the subtlety with which it tracks and shapes opinion (the first message was “we stop genocide in Syria”; then “we champion Sunnis in Iraq”; then “we build a service state”; then “we are a righteous caliphate”); and the effectiveness (so far) of its hybrid military operations in the Syria/Iraq theatre and its stripped-back crowdsourcing model. All these features are linked by a complex thread – the studied marketing of a constructed identity, or performativity, as the theorists say: this is designed to reinforce Da’esh’s self-image as a rightly guided eschatological and millenarian movement, to convey what one analyst calls “a sense of apocalyptic time”, but also to proclaim the temporal success of such an enterprise and communicate purpose while the world watches.

 

When in July 2014 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stood up in his black robes and turban at the great mosque of Nur ad-Din Zengi in Mosul to proclaim the caliphate, he was implicitly claiming to be the heir of the Abbasids (scourges of Ummayad decadence) and of Nur ad-Din’s celebrated military commander, Salah ad-Din (scourge of the Crusaders) – a righteous religious and secular leader and a conqueror. That resonates in a region where history happened yesterday. This is a movement that wants to seem not just blessed and rooted in a mythical past but also profanely effective in a present that holds a mirror to the past.

 

...

 

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Watching dead children floating around in the mediterranian, you have to ask yourself, where is the compassion and where is the heart of all these people who have created this mess.

 

They must have known how much the people would suffer when starting these wars, do they not care ? are they not humans ?

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Interesting (and long!) read on Isis in the New Statesman

...

In Abu Dhabi a few weeks ago, I sat late at night with my old friend Dr Rafi ­al-Issawi, the Sunni former finance minister of Iraq. He was one of the very few senior figures – Sunni or Shia – in Iraq during my time there who was prepared to reach out across sectarian boundaries and think creatively about political solutions to essentially political problems. He still does. Perhaps that is how a medical director who kept his hospital open during the savage battles for Fallujah in 2004, one of the most effective of all the Sunni politicians in Iraq and a man of integrity, is bound to think. His reward? Attempted assassination and then exile on trumped-up charges of supporting terrorism.

We talked of ways to bring the Sunnis back into a political process – as they had been brought back, often by themselves, between 2005 and 2008. I had the same conversation a few days later in Amman, and have done so again in the past week in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, with other Iraqi friends and politicians. Others have identical aspirations. But the Sunni leadership in Iraq, never cohesive, is now even more fragmented than it was in 2011. And the divisions along the lines of identity in Iraq, a country that the distinguished late Iraqi sociologist Ali al-Wardi once characterised as defined by multiple parallel identities, are deeper than ever before.

This represents the triumph of those who have sought to instrumentalise sectarian identities in the pursuit of power: to demonise Sunnis as closet Ba’athists who want revenge, to terrify the Shias with the prospect of renewed oppression, and to claim that security in a state such as Iraq (and by implication the wider region) is assured only through the communal protection afforded by the political expression of essentialist identities. And Da’esh is the flipside. Its appeal in Iraq and elsewhere is powerful. It claims to see through the broken promises and conspiracies of the past decade – ­indeed, the past century, and sometimes the past millennium. It offers a new, sacred, transnational and at the same time territorial model of righteousness. More importantly, it offers a framework within which to construe the pain of dispossession, the loss of power, the rise of others less devout, less deserving, less human. Not only does it claim to answer the question of why sinners’ ways prosper, but by framing the entire issue as one of godliness, it provides a divine dispensation for anything and everything that advances the practical goal of recapturing power and wreaking revenge on an infidel and hostile world. It combines an appeal to faith, tribalism (more precisely to asabiyya, the group solidarity that the great Arab historian Ibn Khaldun identified 600 years ago as the driver of cohesion but also of cyclical conflict in the societies he knew), resentment and the promise of glory.

The mobilisation of identity in the service of combatant politics is hardly exclusive to Da’esh. We see it elsewhere: nationalist identity in China, nationalist-Buddhist in the case of Burma, ethno-religious in Malaysia, sectarian and religious in the case of Islamist movements and some states across the Muslim world. We saw it in the Balkans in the 1990s. We also see a wide use of modern communications techniques to create and then exploit allegedly ancient passions and fears; the mobilisation of grievances; the deliberate destruction of individual and social solidarity; and the construction of radically simplified, harshly communal but powerful forms of connectivity.

The use of purposeful and often sacralised narratives to shape the approach to secular political goals may not be new. They were as much a feature of early-17th-century Europe as of Baghdad in 2010 or Cairo in 2013: think Anabaptist Münster or the English Fifth Monarchists.

But, it seems to me, what is new in the case of Da’esh is the striking combination of a number of features: the clarity of its transnationalism; the speed, professionalism and discipline with which its global religio-identity narratives are produced and flexed; the way these are backed by an encompassing Islamist jurisprudence (look, say, at Turki Binali’s Muqarrar fi al-Tawhid – Da’esh’s basic coursebook); the skill with which they are harnessed to its political goals. There is also the subtlety with which it tracks and shapes opinion (the first message was “we stop genocide in Syria”; then “we champion Sunnis in Iraq”; then “we build a service state”; then “we are a righteous caliphate”); and the effectiveness (so far) of its hybrid military operations in the Syria/Iraq theatre and its stripped-back crowdsourcing model. All these features are linked by a complex thread – the studied marketing of a constructed identity, or performativity, as the theorists say: this is designed to reinforce Da’esh’s self-image as a rightly guided eschatological and millenarian movement, to convey what one analyst calls “a sense of apocalyptic time”, but also to proclaim the temporal success of such an enterprise and communicate purpose while the world watches.

When in July 2014 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stood up in his black robes and turban at the great mosque of Nur ad-Din Zengi in Mosul to proclaim the caliphate, he was implicitly claiming to be the heir of the Abbasids (scourges of Ummayad decadence) and of Nur ad-Din’s celebrated military commander, Salah ad-Din (scourge of the Crusaders) – a righteous religious and secular leader and a conqueror. That resonates in a region where history happened yesterday. This is a movement that wants to seem not just blessed and rooted in a mythical past but also profanely effective in a present that holds a mirror to the past.

...

giphy.gif

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Watching dead children floating around in the mediterranian, you have to ask yourself, where is the compassion and where is the heart of all these people who have created this mess.

 

They must have known how much the people would suffer when starting these wars, do they not care ? are they not humans ?

 

Islamic State fighters and their ilk are barely human beasts. Same goes for their sponsors - who we aren't really supposed to talk about.  Obviously the picture of that poor little boy drowned on a Turkish beach is gut wrenching, but there are plenty of deserving people to take the blame for that before the media and talking heads start riding a wave of emotional indignation and finger pointing at the UK.  

 

First in line are the boy's parents who put their 3 yr old son on a shitty, overloaded inflatable boat and left their safe haven in Turkey to try and chance their arm at getting into Europe. They risked and lost the lives of their children for the chance to marginally improve their circumstances - a very poor cost/benefit and risk analysis on their part.

 

Second in line are the Turks themselves. Why is a first world country and NATO member allowing these people smugglers to operate from their territory?  Are we supposed to believe they do not control their maritime border, that they have no more control than the failed state of Libya?  Just to make things worse, Turkey continues to bomb the bejesus out of the only fighting force in Syria that is effective in the conflict with IS, namely the Kurds.

 

Third in line for a roasting is the EU and particularly Germany. The common asylum policy of the EU and statements around it have explicitly stated that any Syrian refugee that makes it Europe is entitled to stay. Syria now has 10 million internally and externally displaced refugees and these statements encourage them to risk making extremely dangerous journeys with people traffickers, instead of staying put with their families in safe locations. In effect it's moral grand standing by the EU and Merkel leading directly to loss of life in the Med' and the Aegean. What of other countries in conflict? Once the precedent is set is the EU then morally obliged in principle to take in their entire population, and if not then why not? 

 

There are really only two viable ways to help these people that I can see (short of relocating 10 million people from Syria to the EU), the first is to keep doing what we are doing by funding and supporting good quality refugee camps in countries adjacent to their own (UK is the second largest financial contributor in the world to this relief effort). The second is to try and fix the problem at source by directly intervening militarily in Syria. That would cost us in blood and treasure with no guarantees of success, but if people are arguing that we have a responsibility to resettle the Syrian population in the EU then we are already entertaining extreme solutions.      

Edited by Awol
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Watching dead children floating around in the mediterranian, you have to ask yourself, where is the compassion and where is the heart of all these people who have created this mess.

 

They must have known how much the people would suffer when starting these wars, do they not care ? are they not humans ?

 

Islamic State fighters and their ilk are barely human beasts. Same goes for their sponsors - who we aren't really supposed to talk about.  Obviously the picture of that poor little boy drowned on a Turkish beach is gut wrenching, but there are plenty of deserving people to take the blame for that before the media and talking heads start riding a wave of emotional indignation and finger pointing at the UK.  

 

First in line are the boy's parents who put their 3 yr old son on a shitty, overloaded inflatable boat and left their safe haven in Turkey to try and chance their arm at getting into Europe. They risked and lost the lives of their children for the chance to marginally improve their circumstances - a very poor cost/benefit and risk analysis on their part.

 

Second in line are the Turks themselves. Why is a first world country and NATO member allowing these people smugglers to operate from their territory?  Are we supposed to believe they do not control their maritime border, that they have no more control than the failed state of Libya?  Just to make things worse, Turkey continues to bomb the bejesus out of the only fighting force in Syria that is effective in the conflict with IS, namely the Kurds.

 

Third in line for a roasting is the EU and particularly Germany. The common asylum policy of the EU and statements around it have explicitly stated that any Syrian refugee that makes it Europe is entitled to stay. Syria now has 10 million internally and externally displaced refugees and these statements encourage them to risk making extremely dangerous journeys with people traffickers, instead of staying put with their families in safe locations. In effect it's moral grand standing by the EU and Merkel leading directly to loss of life in the Med' and the Aegean. What of other countries in conflict? Once the precedent is set is the EU then morally obliged in principle to take in their entire population, and if not then why not? 

 

There are really only two viable ways to help these people that I can see (short of relocating 10 million people from Syria to the EU), the first is to keep doing what we are doing by funding and supporting good quality refugee camps in countries adjacent to their own (UK is the second largest financial contributor in the world to this relief effort). The second is to try and fix the problem at source by directly intervening militarily in Syria. That would cost us in blood and treasure with no guarantees of success, but if people are arguing that we have a responsibility to resettle the Syrian population in the EU then we are already entertaining extreme solutions.      

 

First to blame is Assad and his army.

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First to blame is Assad and his army.

 

Four years ago, sure. Now they are all that stands between the non-Sunni Muslim population and a mass grave. 

 

We had the chance to get behind the secular (or at least non-Islamist) Free Syrian Army when it all kicked off but no one wanted to intervene decisively on their behalf. Instead the Gulfies filled the vacuum with their cash, weapons and Wahhabi ideology, changing a democratic uprising into a sectarian slaughterhouse. 

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Who does sponsor ISIS Awol?

 

Now they are pretty much self sufficient financially, but originally a mix of Turkey and the great and the good from Saudi, Kuwait and other Arab states. Knocking off Assad was seen as a way to strike at the Iranians indirectly, not a great deal of thought was given to what Frankenstein's monster might do if they lost control of it.   Now it's threatening to eat the lot of them but they don't have a plausible counter narrative because IS' ideology is so closely aligned to what you would hear coming from a Saudi mosque any given Friday lunchtime - kill the Shia, kill the gays, kill the Jews etc etc. 

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